










On the evening of 25 April 2017, at the airport in Yaoundé, Cameroon, I had to decide 
whether to join the Hilton shuttle bus—escorted by a truck with armed gendarmes—or be 
driven to the hotel by a local contact and a driver who apparently doubled as a bodyguard. I 
chose the latter, thinking that a bus full of Westerners would be an easier target for Boko 
Haram, the terrorist group operating in Northern Cameroon. The local contact emphasised the 
need to stay at the Hilton, because it was the only place with sufficient security. Upon arrival, 
cars were searched for explosives, while guests and their luggage were screened at the entrance. 
Government agents sat in the lobby, hardly making any effort at being inconspicuous. They 
kept a close eye on who was meeting who and listened in on conversations by casually leaning 
against the wall or sitting at a neighbouring table.  
I was in Yaoundé for a trial observation in the case of Felix Agbor Balla (a lawyer), 
Fontem Neba (an academic), and others. From October to December 2016, they had led protests 
by lawyers and teachers in the English-speaking Northwest and Southwest regions of 
Cameroon, particularly in the respective capital cities of Bamenda and Buea. The protests had 
broken out because French-speaking teachers and lawyers, trained in the French educational 
and civil law systems, were appointed in regions where a British educational system and 
common law are used. More generally, the protests reflected a growing dissatisfaction with the 
marginalisation of English-speaking Cameroonians, as well as their lack of political 
representation and participation in public life.  
The division between the French and English-speaking parts of the country can be 
traced back to its colonial past. Cameroon was a German colony from the mid-1880s until 
1914. After World War I, the League of Nations granted a Class B mandate1 to France and 
Britain to administer the territory; the latter being responsible for the Western regions.2 In 1960, 
the French part gained independence and the République du Cameroun was constituted.3 In 
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1961, the Northern part of the territory administered by Britain voted in a plebiscite to become 
part of Nigeria—which had gained independence only the year before—while the South voted 
to become part of the newly independent Cameroon. The inhabitants of the latter hoped to 
preserve their cultural identity and some degree of independence under the federalist system, 
established in the Cameroonian Constitution of 1961. The population was asked in the 
plebiscite whether it wished to be ‘independent by joining the Republic of Cameroon?’.4 The 
Southern territory, now part of Cameroon, was subsequently divided into a Northwest and 
Southwest region.5 
In 1972, an amendment to the Constitution abolished the federal system and the country 
became a ‘unified republic’ (République unie du Cameroun) after a referendum in which an 
unlikely 99.7 per cent of the population voted in favour.6 In 1982, the first President of 
Cameroon—Amadou Ahidjo, who was put forward by France and held the position for almost 
25 years—announced that he would hand over the Presidency to Paul Biya.7 In 1984, the name 
République du Cameroun was reintroduced and an amendment to the Constitution in 1996 
established a decentralised administrative and political system.8 The Constitution currently in 
force, most recently amended in 2008, provides in its Article 1(2) that: ‘[t]he Republic of 
Cameroon shall be a decentralized unitary State’ and that: ‘[t]he official languages of the 
Republic of Cameroon shall be English and French, both languages having the same status’. 
Both French and English-speaking Cameroonians suffer from the lack of good 
governance and corruption of the Biya regime, but many of the latter feel that ‘there is little 
prospect of them ever becoming “proper” citizens’ and have tried to emigrate since the late 
1990s.9 This feeling of disempowerment is expressed in the poetry of English-speaking 
Cameroonian poets, which is ‘replete with images and symbols of death, decay, emptiness, 
sterility and disillusionment’.10 An example of this is Bernard Fonlon’s poem ‘The Fear of 
Future Years’, published two years after the North and Southwest regions became part of the 
independent Republic of Cameroon:11  
Those hopes absurd 
In youth that spurred 
All shrunk like fountains dried12 
 
This note describes the proceedings that took place on 27 April 2017 before the Military 
Tribunal of Yaoundé (the ‘Tribunal’) and events leading to the accused being tried for 
terrorism-related offences. It captures a particular moment in the trial and in Cameroon’s recent 
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history, just before the country would slide into a non-international armed conflict. 
International law looms large here: in the defence team’s pleadings, in the international human 
rights standards violated during the trial, and in the subsequent declaration of an independent 
state by armed separatists in October 2017.  
However, perhaps most interesting during my time in Cameroon was that which 
remained unspoken, namely that recent events originated in the administration of territories 
under the League of Nations’ mandate system. Colonialist thinking permeated the local 
lawyers’ discourse and, as an international lawyer, I too found it difficult to distance myself 
from that colonial past. In the following, I first describe the events as they took place, before 
offering some reflections on the reluctant—but inescapable—involvement of (inter)national 
lawyers in colonial legacies.  
 
PROTESTS AND ARRESTS IN THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING REGIONS 
The protests that took place in the North and Southwest regions between October and 
December 2016 were met with excessive force by the police, who used tear gas to disperse the 
crowds.13 Approximately 100 people were arrested without being informed of the charges 
against them.14 Some were later released and others remain in detention. Lawyers who took 
part in the protests had their robes and wigs ripped off and were beaten with batons.15 Around 
the same time, the Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium (CACSC) was established 
by Balla, Neba, and others to act as an interlocutor in negotiations with the Government. 
However, meetings between members of the CACSC and state authorities were unsuccessful.16  
In January 2017, the protesters declared ‘ghost towns’; days on which lawyers and 
teachers went on strike and shops closed for business. On 17 January 2017, the Government 
declared the CACSC illegal, shut down the internet in the Northwest and Southwest regions 
only—thereby targeting the inhabitants of these regions specifically and infringing their right 
to access to information. This measure was allegedly taken to prevent the Cameroonian 
diaspora from spreading false information and inciting violence. At the same time, Balla, Neba 
and others were arrested.17 Some, whose names appeared on lists circulated by the police, were 
called for interrogation and went into hiding or exile.18 On 20 January 2017, the State 
Prosecutor (Commissaire du Gouvernment) at the Tribunal charged Balla and Neba, together 
with Mancho Bibixy (a radio show host who protested in a public square next to a coffin, saying 
his corpse would lie in it if necessary), with ‘terrorism, hostility against the motherland, 
secession, insurrection, contempt of public authorities, and collective rebellion’; ‘incitement to 
civil war by bringing the inhabitants of the South[west] and Northwest regions to arm 
themselves against other citizens’; and ‘attempt[ing] to modify the constitutional laws, notably 
 
13 Amnesty International, Cameroon, ‘Excessive Force that Led to Deaths of Protesters Must Be Urgently 
Investigated’, 9 December 2016, available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/12/cameroon-
excessive-force-that-led-to-deaths-of-protesters-must-be-urgently-investigated/ (last visited 17 July 2018). 
14 Meeting with defence counsel, Yaoundé, April 2017. 
 
15 Telephone conversations with two lawyers in exile, May 2017.
 
16 Meeting with lawyer who went into hiding, Yaoundé, April 2017.
 
17 Amnesty International, Cameroon, ‘Arrests and Civil Society Bans Risk Inflaming Tensions in English-
Speaking Regions’, 20 January 2017, available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2017/01/cameroon-
arrests-and-civil-society-bans-risk-inflaming-tensions-in-english-speaking-regions/ (last visited 13 November 
2018). 




the federalist system, through violence’.19 In the same document (an ordre de mise en jugement 
direct), the State Prosecutor ordered their detention and submitted them to the jurisdiction of 
the Tribunal for judgment.20  
All protesters who had been arrested were charged with the same or similar offences 
and tried before the Tribunal, which assumed jurisdiction pursuant to Law No 2014/028 of 23 
December 2014 on the Suppression Acts of Terrorism (‘Terrorism Law’).21 Almost all the 
offences described as ‘acts of terrorism’ in the Terrorism Law carry the death penalty. The 
Tribunal applies the Terrorism Law, the Military Justice Code, the Criminal Code, and the 
Criminal Procedure Code. The Military Justice Code provides that the Tribunal has jurisdiction 
over military offences, but also over certain offences committed by civilians, such as armed 
robbery. This explains the backlog of cases; it does not only hear cases of Boko Haram fighters.  
 
THE COURTROOM IN THE MILITARY COMPOUND 
On 27 April 2017, after several hearings had been adjourned,22 arguments on a bail 
application and—possibly—the merits of the case would be heard. By that time, the accused 
had been held in pre-trial detention for over three months.23 On the morning of the day of the 
hearing, we showed our passports to the officers standing guard outside the military 
compound—where the Tribunal is based—and the doors opened. Somewhat disconcertingly, 
the guard disappeared with our passports as the doors closed behind us. Apparently, in order to 
be issued with a visitor’s badge, it was necessary to hand in one’s passport. . 
The military compound is close to Yaoundé’s city centre and, apart from army barracks, 
houses two adjoining buildings. One of these is the courtroom and in the other are the offices 
of the State Prosecutor, Registrar, and President of the Tribunal. After waiting outside the 
courtroom for a while, we were ushered into the State Prosecutor’s office. Sitting at his desk, 
flanked by officials who looked stern but slightly curious, he informed us that he was not at 
liberty to discuss the case without prior authorisation from the Minister of Justice or Minister 
of Defence. He seemed to suggest that we should obtain such authorisation to be able to attend 
the hearing. However, when a lawyer who was accompanying us summarised his 
understanding that we were allowed to attend the hearing, but not discuss the case without prior 
authorisation, the State Prosecutor nodded in agreement.  
It was a relief to be allowed entry, especially because military jurisdiction is often 
associated with trials behind closed doors. At the far end of the courtroom, there was a platform 
 
19 Ordre de mise en jugement direct, Military Tribunal of Yaoundé, 20 January 2017 (on file with author).  
20 Ibid. 
21 Although Section 3 of the law ‘To Organize Military Justice and Lay Down Rules of Procedure Applicable 
Before Military Tribunals’, Law No 2008/015, 29 December 2008, provides that military tribunals be set up in 
each region of the country, the same section provides that the Military Tribunal in Yaoundé may exercise its 
powers throughout the national territory in the event of exceptional circumstances, such as those specified in Art. 
9 of the Constitution of Cameroon, which constitute a serious threat to public order or state security, or terrorism. 
22 The first hearing in the case of Balla and Neba was scheduled for 3 February 2017 but adjourned until 13 
February 2017. During that hearing, the defence challenged the lack of adequate interpretation from French into 
English and the prosecution informed the Tribunal that it had not yet finalised its list of witnesses. The hearing 
was postponed until 23 March 2017, when the prosecution requested that case to be joined with another case 
against 25 defendants. The Tribunal granted the joinder on 7 April 2017, despite the defence arguing that the cases 
regarded facts that took place at different times and places. The hearing was again adjourned until 27 April 2017. 
23 The Terrorism Law provides in its section 11, entitled ‘[r]emand in custody’, that the duration of custody is 
fifteen days renewable ‘upon the authorisation of the State Prosecutor’. There is no maximum time limit, 
requirement to justify the authorisation of extension, or a decision by a judge. 
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on which the President of the Tribunal and two assessors sat. All three judges were serving 
military officers, dressed in uniform. The President was a woman with the rank of Colonel and 
a trained lawyer. Her assessors were men, lower in rank, and at least one of them was not a 
lawyer. The prosecution sat to the right, together with—in this case—the legal representative 
of the civil party. The defence, sitting to the left, was a team of 15 people, almost all former 
Presidents of the Cameroon Bar Association, both English- and French- speaking. In the middle 
were two wooden boxes—open structures—with seats for two people each; the accused and 
witnesses, respectively. Behind a wooden partitioning were two rows of benches for the public.  
The courtroom was filled with family members of the accused, common law lawyers—
recognisable by their wigs—and civil law lawyers with a fur trimming on their black robes. 
The only other international representatives were from the embassies of the UK, Canada, the 
US, and the field office of the UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, based 
in Cameroon. There was no air-conditioning or ventilation and it was stifling hot. Doors were 
open at the side and back of the courtroom, but there was no breeze. After some time, the 
defendants arrived with their prison guards. First, Balla and Neba; then Bibixy and the other 
25 accused. They arrived separately because Balla and Neba were held at the Prison Principale 
de Yaoundé, a prison for high profile offenders and those accused of terrorism, while others 
were held at Yaoundé’s central prison.  
 
THE HEARING AT THE MILITARY TRIBUNAL 
The President of the Tribunal opened the hearing around midday by reading out the 
defendants’ names; each one stepping forward into the wooden boxes. Balla, Neba and Bibixy 
in one box; the other 25 accused pressed up against each other in the other box. The absence 
of microphones together with the murmur from the public gallery made it hard to understand 
what was being said. The interpretation from French into English immediately proved 
problematic. The interpreter made a few hesitant attempts to translate, was corrected by the 
President of the Tribunal, and then abruptly stopped interpreting for the remainder of the 
hearing (except for submissions on the bail application, which she interpreted from English 
into French for the judges).  
The prosecution announced that its witnesses were ready to be heard. However, after 
some discussion between the prosecution and lawyers of a civil party, the latter informed the 
Tribunal that they wished to intervene in the proceedings on behalf of victims who had been 
wounded in the protests. It was unclear who these victims were; their legal representative 
refused to identify them on security grounds. The prosecution argued that an adjournment of 
the hearing was necessary due to this intervention, which the defence opposed. The President 
of the Tribunal did not grant an adjournment and the hearing continued.  
The defence team wanted to apply for bail, but the prosecution and President of the 
Tribunal said that they had never received the bail application. This was contested by the 
defence, who handed out copies so that submissions could be made. An English barrister and 
member of the defence team read out Balla’s and Neba’s cvs to argue that Cameroon should 
be proud of these men and not detain them as terrorists. Balla’s cv included his studies at the 
University of Notre Dame and work for the UN, in stark contrast with the other defendants, 
none of whom seemed to have enjoyed a similar education. I thought this was a risky strategy 
in a West African country that seeks to assert its independence from colonial and Western 
powers, especially the British.  
The submissions in English highlighted one of the main difficulties of these 
proceedings. When French-speaking members of the defence team, the prosecution, or the 
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President of the Tribunal spoke, the 25 accused stared despondently at the floor or the ceiling, 
looking tired and disaffected. However, when the bail application was made in English, all 
heads turned as they listened intently to the lawyer speaking a language they understood.  
Defence counsel argued that Balla and Neba had no previous convictions and that the 
judges were under oath to apply the Constitution, which refers to universal and regional human 
rights instruments. It also refers to the presumption of innocence, the right to a fair hearing, 
and the fact that treaties shall ‘override national laws’.24 Subsequently, French-speaking 
members of the defence team presented lengthy arguments, seemingly to indulge the egos of 
the speakers rather than serve the interest of their clients. The latter had already been standing 
for three hours in the sweltering heat without food or water. Finally, after the arguments on bail 
had been made, defence counsel requested that the accused be seated. The 25, together with 
Bibixy, were led back to the benches of the public gallery by prison guards, while Balla and 
Neba were seated together in one of the wooden boxes. In a strange intermezzo, the prosecution 
took the opportunity to distribute what appeared to be chocolate bars to the judges and some 
members of the defence team. 
Finally, a member of the defence team read out the names of the 25 others accused and 
said that all submissions regarding the bail application for Balla and Neba also applied to them. 
She argued that they were laymen, students, journalists, ‘men of the street’, who also had a 
right to be free and presumed innocent. Some had allegedly been beaten for days by the police. 
Since many were farmers, it was unclear why they would represent a flight risk. The 
prosecution did not make any substantive arguments on the bail applications, so the President 
of the Tribunal adjourned the hearing—again for one month, without the justification required 
for a repeated prolongation of pre-trial detention under universal and regional human rights 
law—until 24 May 2017.  
 
IN THE WAITING ROOMS OF THE OFFICIALS 
The day after the hearing, the defence counsel obtained permission for us to visit Balla 
and Neba at the prison where they were being held. It was a short drive through an 
impoverished part of town, where everything from clothing to live chickens were being sold 
along the roadside. We waited outside the prison gates, next to the entrance where a list of 
registered defence counsel was pinned to the wall. After guards inspected our passports and 
discussed with officials inside the prison, we were let in and crossed the courtyard.  
We met the prison Director in his office, who explained that there were three different 
regimes for visitors: one for legal representatives, who were allowed to visit their clients during 
working hours if their name was on the list of counsel displayed at the entrance; another for 
family members and friends, who were allowed to visit prisoners with the State Prosecutor’s 
permission; a third for international visitors or observers, who required prior authorisation from 
the Minister of Justice or the Minister of Defence. Since we fell into the third category, we 
were not allowed to meet with the prisoners and were escorted out of the building.  
We returned to the centre of Yaoundé to seek permission from the Ministry of Defence but 
were told that we needed permission from the Ministry of Justice, since prison regimes fell 
under its jurisdiction. We had sought a meeting with the Minister of Justice prior to the hearing, 
without success. After being asked to fill out the same form twice, they informed us that the 
Minister would meet with us and we were led into an airconditioned waiting room. Some copies 
of the Government-sponsored newspaper on a coffee table and the pleasant surroundings 
 
24 Constitution of Cameroon, Art. 45 and Cameroon Penal Code, s 2 ch. 1. 
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suggested that we were getting closer to power. However, after waiting for two hours, we were 
told that the Minister was ‘still in another meeting’ and we decided to leave.  
Upon our return to the Ministry of Justice the next day, we met with the Director of the 
Department of Penitentiary Administration, who explained the distinction between a request to 
visit a prison—which fell under his jurisdiction—and a request to visit a particular prisoner—
which was decided upon by the authority under whose jurisdiction the prisoner was being 
detained (in this case, the Ministry of Defence). In other words, each Ministry referred to the 
other; we were going around in circles. 
The President of the Tribunal did take time to meet with us. She received us in her office 
at the military compound; our seats at a distance against the wall opposite her desk. The 
President was friendly, but formal, and our discussion focused only on the technicalities of 
military jurisdiction in Cameroon. At the end of the meeting, she expressed her appreciation 
for our interest in how that jurisdiction operates—considering that military jurisdiction ‘usually 
has a bad reputation’—and for trying to ‘educate ourselves’ instead of just writing a critical 
report after leaving the country. She suspected, of course, that such a report would nonetheless 
be written. 
After reading the local newspapers to check for coverage of the hearing and meeting with 
a lawyer who had gone into hiding, I returned to the airport; this time in the Hilton shuttle bus. 
After enduring some minor abuses of power by lower level officials, a reminder of being at the 
mercy of bureaucrats in a dictatorship, I waited in the lounge with President Biya’s portrait 
looking down on me. After a short stop in Douala, still Cameroonian territory, I was on my 
way back to Brussels.  
 
AN IMITATION OF A TRIAL; COLONIAL LEGACIES 
On the plane, I wrote the outline of the trial observation report that was subsequently 
published online.25 It includes a brief description of the history and context of the trial, the 
applicable law on military jurisdiction, the deficiencies of the Terrorism Law together with 
observations made during the hearing, and conclusions drawn regarding human rights 
violations (mainly fair trial guarantees) with reference to domestic, regional, and international 
law.  In it, a short and hectic experience was condensed and translated into legal vocabulary.26 
Specifically, the violations identified included the right to a defence (namely, access to the 
case file), the right to an interpreter, the right to be tried without undue delay, the right to pre-
trial release, and the right to physical integrity. The report also addressed the fact that the 
exercise of jurisdiction by a military tribunal over civilians, although in accordance with 
domestic law, constitutes a violation of Art. 7(1)(d) of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights and Art. 14(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) insofar as such jurisdiction should be exceptional.27 and the Cameroonian authorities 
had not demonstrated the necessity of such jurisdiction in this case. Moreover, although serving 
military officers without legal training may act as judges in a court martial, in these proceedings 
 
25 M Brilman, Trial Observation Report (Cameroon), The Law Society of England and Wales, 2017, available at 
http://communities.lawsociety.org.uk/international/international-rule-of-law/lawyers-at-risk/trial-observation-
report-cameroon/5061833.article (last visited 12 November 2018). 
26 D Kennedy, ‘Spring Break’ 63 Texas Law Review (1985) 1387. 
27 Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No 32, Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals 
and to a Fair Trial’, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/32, 23 August 2007), para. 22. 
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this constituted a violation of the right to be tried by a ‘competent, independent and impartial 
tribunal’.28 
Although the writing of the report, its dissemination, and the way in which it was received 
were briefly satisfying, I was reminded of the futility of the whole exercise when a member of 
the defence team, visiting London for meetings, commented that ‘the trial covers the real 
problem’ — it diverts the attention away from the marginalisation of English-speaking 
Cameroonians. An example of such marginalisation being ‘the road between Yaoundé and the 
Northwest [which] is tarred up to the anglophone border’.29 All this was not about the trial or 
these particular defendants, but about a history of state neglect that dates back to the 
constitution of the Republique du Cameroun. Such neglect was evident in the lack of 
investment in infrastructure and political will to improve the living conditionsof English-
speaking citizens.  
The statement that the trial ‘covers the real problem’ also suggests that Balla and Neba’s 
trial was, in fact, an ‘imitation’ of a trial30 or a ‘show trial’,31 to the extent that it ‘support[ed] 
political motives which had nothing to do with criminal trials’.32 All parties involved in the 
proceedings at the Tribunal seemed to be aware that they were participating insuch a trial.Did 
my trial observation report not also legitimise the trial, even if it identified particular violations 
of rights? Did my presence during the proceedings give legitimacy to the authoritarian regime 
that instituted (and allegedly instructed) the military courts before which the trial was 
conducted? 
This moral dilemma of complicity33 seems especially acute for defence counsel: is it in 
the best interest of the client to provide him or her with an adequate defence against the charges 
brought or to denounce the proceedings as illegitimate and refuse participation altogether? 
After all, ‘[t]o accept the terms in which the trial is conducted . . . is to already accept one 
interpretation of the context among those between which the political struggle has been 
waged’.34  
This dilemma has real consequences for procedural decision-making. As a member of 
the defence team said: ‘It is not really a trial, it is dealing with a political situation. Knowing 
that, the strategy is different’. Perhaps because of this, the otherwise incomprehensible decision 
was taken not to challenge the lack of interpretation during the hearing, even though this 
constituted a flagrant violation of due process. Such a challenge would probably have resulted 
in another adjournment, which would have prolonged the defendants’ pre-trial detention. It 
may have been less important for the accused to understand their own counsel’s submissions 
and the goings-on in their trial, because the outcome was already decided.  
Although the colonial context was never explicitly referred to during the hearing or in 
meetings with officials, it constituted the backdrop to everything: the protests, the arrests, the 
trial. Some remarks by a fellow trial observer from the UK, including on the skin colour of 
someone on the defence team, served as a reminder that the idea of British Empire is still very 
much alive, as well as—unfortunately—statements made by Cameroonian defence counsel. 
 
28 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) 999 UNTS 1057, Art. 14(1).  
29 Meeting with defence counsel, 10 August 2017, London. 
30
 Kennedy (1985) 1407.  
31 M Koskenniemi, ‘Between Impunity and Show Trials’ 6 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law (2002) 
1, 7 (referring to Hannah Arendt). 
32 Ibid. 
33 M Sfard, ‘The Human Rights Lawyer’s Existential Dilemma’ 38 Israel Law Review (2005) 154.
 
34 Koskenniemi (2002) 16-17. 
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The latter said, for example, that English was the ‘language [of] civilisation; that ‘multiparty 
democracy claims started in the anglophone regions, because we were trained to claim our 
rights’;35 and that the common law system is obviously ‘fairer’ than the civil law system, its 
flexibility more practical in a country largely ruled by different tribal customs.36  
Perhaps I was sensitive to such statements as a lawyer educated in (and, to a certain extent, 
partial to) the civil law system. However, what made these statements especially uncomfortable 
was that the local lawyer seemed to buy into a colonial discourse. In this regard, Nathaniel 
Berman has described the ‘internalization’ of ‘identities projected from the metropoles’,37 
explaining with regard to the Algerian civil war that  
the terms set by this dynamic can lead to horrors long after colonialism passes from the scene. 
For example, the colonial power attempted to heighten both linguistic and gender divisions 
within Maghrebin society in order to assimilate elements of that society to French culture. The 
colonial power wanted to provide a social base for the legal argument that events in North 
Africa were domestic French matters.38  
The defence team had hired the services of a British barrister to defend the English-
speaking accused before a French-speaking military court. In my view, this heightened the 
linguistic and cultural division and drew unwanted attention to a colonial past that was 
primarily responsible for the recent conflict. The unquestioned authority attributed to the 
barrister reminded me of my local contact saying that ‘Cameroonians prefer Nescafé over 
locally harvested coffee’ (referring to a belief that everything that comes from the West is 
better, regardless of the actual quality of the product). Moreover, the same local contact had 
requested that the trial observers that would attend be ‘white’. Embassies normally send local 
staff to trial observations, but only ‘white faces’ in the room would make it immediately clear 
to the judges that international observers were present. Only the US embassy sent a white 
member of staff. 
As an international lawyer, my reason for being in Cameroon was directly related to 
the consequences of a colonial past of which I too felt somehow a part. As a Dutch national, I 
would have felt this more acutely had the trial taken place in Suriname or Indonesia (in which 
case I am unsure whether my presence would have contributed to some historical understanding 
or been mostly prejudicial). Although the Netherlands never colonised Cameroon, I am from a 
former colonial power and, while in Cameroon, I represented a British institution.  
 
CONCLUSION 
As some had anticipated, on 30 August 2017 President Biya ordered the 
‘discontinuance of proceedings’ against Balla and Neba.39 If ever there was a good example of 
a lack of prosecutorial independence, this was surely it. Together with approximately 53 others 
who had been detained after the protests, they were unconditionally released in early September 
 
35 The Commonwealth, ‘Cameroon: History’, available at http://thecommonwealth.org/our-member-
countries/cameroon/history (last visited 17 July 2018). Multipartyism was formally introduced in 1990, with first 
elections being held in 1992, after a campaign of civil disobedience that included ‘ghost towns’. 
36 Meeting with defence counsel, August 2017, London. 
37 N Berman, ‘In the Wake of Empire’ 14 American University International Law Review (1999) 1515, 1547. 
38 Ibid. 
 
39 Presidency of the Republic, Republic of Cameroon, ‘Violence in the North West and South West Regions: The 
Head of State Orders End of Court Proceedings’, 30 August 2017, available at: 
https://www.prc.cm/en/multimedia/documents/5768-crise-nw-sw-communique-min-sgpr-arret-poursuites-en 
(last visited 13 November 2018). 
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2017. However, the President of the Tribunal reminded them that they could be charged and 
detained again in future. One explanation for the release was that President Biya hoped to gain 
support from English-speaking Cameroonians for the Presidential elections in 2018, because it 
would supposedly lead to the re-opening of schools in the Northwest and Southwest.40 
Otherwise, the school boycotts played into the hands of the Government which was allegedly 
‘delighted that a generation of anglophone children remains uneducated’ so that they would 
not be able to formulate any claims to public participation and representation in the future.41  
A few weeks after the release of Balla and Neba, protests flared up again in the English-
speaking regions. The Government deployed soldiers on the ground, who opened fire and killed 
several civilians.42 Since then, separatists have declared an independent state of Ambazonia,43 
military operations have been carried out in the Northwest and Southwest, and several villages 
have been burned down.44 Both state security forces, particularly Cameroon’s Rapid 
Intervention Battalion—an elite army unit equipped and trained by the US and Israel45—as 
well as armed separatists have killed and tortured civilians.46 The US accused the Cameroonian 
Government of targeted killings and arson.47 According to UN agencies, at the end of May 
2018 there were 160 000 internally displaced persons in Cameroon (90 per cent in the 
Southwest region) and over 21 000 registered as refugees in Nigeria.48 In January 2018, 
Nigerian security services had abducted 12 members of the Ambazonian ‘government’ from a 
hotel in Abuja and sent them back to Cameroon, where they are now detained as terrorists, 
 
40 Meeting with defence counsel, August 2017, London.
 
41 Ibid. 
42 ‘At Least Eight Dead amid Cameroon Anglophone Protests’, Reuters, 1 October 2017, available at 
https://in.reuters.com/article/cameroon-politics/at-least-eight-dead-amid-cameroon-anglophone-protests-
idINKCN1C61B3 (last visited 17 July 2018); ‘Cameroon Soldiers Shoot Independence Activists Dead’, The 
Guardian, 1 October 2017, available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/01/cameroon-soldiers-
shoot-independence-activists-dead (last visited 17 July 2018); Amnesty International, Cameroon, ‘Seventeen 
Killed following Protests in Anglophone Regions’, 2 October 2017, available at 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2017/10/cameroon-seventeen-killed-following-protests-in-
anglophone-regions/ (last visited 17 July 2018); UN News Centre, Cameroon, ‘UN Secretary-General Urges 
Dialogue to Resolve Grievances’, 3 October 2017, available at https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/10/567632-
cameroon-un-secretary-general-urges-dialogue-resolve-grievances (last visited 17 July 2018). 
43 Maja-Pearce (2018) 23 (named after the English Baptist Missionary Society’s colony for freed slaves in Ambas 
Bay). 
44 Amnesty International, ‘A Turn for the Worse: Violence and Human Rights Violations in Anglophone 
Cameroon’ (2018) 10, available at 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR1784812018ENGLISH.PDF (last visited 13 November 
2018). 
45 ‘Burning Cameroon: Images You’re Not Meant to See’, BBC News, 25 June 2018, available at 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-44561929 (last visited 17 July 2018). 
46 ‘Dozens Killed in Cameroon’s Restive Anglophone Region’, Reuters, 26 May 2018, available at 
https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-cameroon-separatists/dozens-killed-in-cameroons-restive-anglophone-region-
idUKKCN1IR0GV (last visited 17 July 2018). Amnesty International (2018) 5,6, 12. 
47 ‘US Accuses Cameroon of “Targeted Killings” of Anglophones’, Reuters, 18 May 2018, available at 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cameroon-usa/u-s-accuses-cameroon-of-targeted-killings-of-anglophones-
idUSKCN1IJ23Y (last visited 17 July 2018). 
48 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Cameroon: Emergency Response Plan 
Seeks US$15M to Reach 160,000 Internally Displaced People in the Next Three Months’, 29 May 2018, available 
at https://www.unocha.org/story/cameroon-emergency-response-plan-seeks-us15m-reach-160000-internally-
displaced-people-next (last visited 17 July 2018); United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Flash 
Update: Cameroonian Refugee Situation 5th May–1st June 2018’, 12 June 2018, available at 
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/64057 (last visited 17 July 2018). 
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together with 35 other refugees sent back by Nigeria.49 In May 2018, the Tribunal convicted 
seven anglophone activists for terrorism, insurrection, and secession; including the radio host 
Bibixy, previously charged and then released but now sentenced to 15 years imprisonment.50 
The last time I saw him was at the military compound, where he was escorted—shackled—to 
the bathroom by an armed gendarme.  
These events demonstrate how an initially peaceful protest by unarmed civilians 
escalated into a non-international armed conflict. Undoubtedly, the heavy-handed suppression 
of dissent, including the prosecution of civil society leaders as terrorists before military courts, 
contributed to the current situation. The US, Canada, France, and Britain have engaged with 
the Cameroonian Government diplomatically.51 However, the effectiveness of these efforts is 
undoubtedly hampered by the latter two states’ colonial past and the interest of all to cooperate 
militarily with the Governments of Cameroon and Nigeria to stem the rise of Boko Haram in 
the region.  
On 7 October 2018, Biya won the elections with 71 per cent of the vote; turnout in the 
anglophone regions was only 10 per cent and there were numerous allegations of fraud.52 As 
Biya starts his seventh term in office, he and his wife Chantal would do well to travel the 
untarred road from Yaoundé to the Northwest. This dusty road represents division but, at the 
same time, the possibility to bridge it. It is, after all, a path that connects Cameroon’s citizens—
whether anglophone or francophone. As local and international lawyers we surely hold more 
in common than the differences between common and civil law systems suggest. However, the 
difficulty for international lawyers is that our discipline lies at the heart of the division that 
sparked the conflict. International law (in this case through the League of Nations’ mandate 
system) created—or at least contributed to—this non-international armed conflict and 
subsequently takes such conflict as an object of study. It creates its own subject matter, 
externalising conflict as if playing no part in its constitution in order to then claim legitimacy 
to study it ‘objectively’. As practitioners and academics in international law, we have to 
recognise that we too are implicated in colonial legacies and consider each time whether our 
expertise will contribute to a post- or neo-colonial future.  
 
49 Maja-Pearce (2018) 23, 25 (Nigeria’s President sought to ensure that Nigerian ‘territory is not used as a staging 
area to destabilise another friendly sovereign country’. A territorial dispute over an archipelago was settled in 
Cameroon’s favour by the ICJ in 2002, based on agreements entered into by colonial powers.) 
50 ‘Cameroon Military Court Jails Anglophone Activists’, BBC News, 26 May 2018, available at 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-44263218 (last visited 13 November 2018); ‘Cameroon Court Convicts 
Anglophone Activists of Rebellion and Terrorism’, Reuters, 25 May 2018, available at 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cameroon-separatists/cameroon-court-convicts-anglophone-activists-of-
rebellion-and-terrorism-idUSKCN1IQ32T (last visited 13 November 2018). 
51 Confirmed by the US embassy’s representative in Yaoundé, who attended the hearing, as well as in meetings 
with the UK embassy in Yaoundé and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 
52 B Kiven, S Stone & R Maclean, ‘Biya Wins Again in Cameroon as Crackdown Disrupts Anglophone Vote’, 
The Guardian, 22 October 2018, available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/22/paul-biya-
cameroon-85-year-old-president-wins-re-election-landslide (last visited 12 November 2018). 
